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INMATE ABORTIONS-THE RIGHT TO GOVERNMENT FUNDING
BEHIND THE PRISON GATES
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade' established that a woman has the
absolute right to obtain an abortion in the first trimester and a qualified right to
obtain one thereafter.2 Courts3 and legislatures4 have subsequently deliberated
the parameters of that right.5 Several states have recently enacted statutes that
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 154, 163-64. This landmark decision expectedly precipitated both thunderous acclaim
and cries of betrayal from the media, the pulpit, and judicial chambers. E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1973, at 1, col. 1; id. at 1, col. 2; id. at 20, col. 1; Catholic News, Jan. 25, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
Furthermore, challenges to that right continue to surface in Congress. Proposing an Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States for the Protection of Unborn Children and Other Persons:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 119 & 130 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974); Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
3. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) (minor's right to abortion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979) (abortion procedures); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (government funding of
nontherapeutic abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (same); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977)
(same); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (consent requirement); Hodgson v.
Board of County Comm'rs, No. 79-1665 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980) (effect of Hyde Amendment on state
statute concerning government funding of abortion); Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, No.
79-1275 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980) (constitutional obligation of state to fund medically necessary
abortions); Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196(7th Cir.), review granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov.
26, 1979) (No. 79-5) (state funding of medically necessary abortions); Baird v. Department of Public
Health, 599 F.2d 1098 (1st Cir. 1979) (state licensing of abortion clinics); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis,
591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979) (effect of Hyde Amendment on state
statute concerning government funding of abortion); McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980), appeal docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S.
Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-1268) (obligation of federal government to pay medicaid recipients for
medically necessary abortions); Women's Health Servs. v. Maher, No. 79-405 (D. Conn. Jan. 7,
1980) (constitutional obligation of state to fund medically necessary abortions); Doe v. Busbee,
471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (state funding); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa.
1978), appealfiled, No. 79-1247 (3d Cir. Jan. 23, 1979) (same); D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D.
Utah), appeal filed, No. 78-1675 (1oth Cir. Aug. 23, 1978) (same).
4. Since 1976, Congress has annually enacted the Hyde Amendment, restricting federal funding
of abortion. Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109.93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979); Departments of
Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210,
92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978); Continuing Appropriations of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat.
1460, 1460 (1977); Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). The current version of the Hyde
Amendment restricts federal funding of abortions "except where the life of the mother would be
endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the
victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly." Act of Nov. 20, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1976). The Supreme Court will review the
constitutionality of this statute. Harris v. McRae, No. 79-1268 (U.S., docketed Feb. 19, 1980).
Pending this decision, the federal government must fund therapeutic abortions for indigent free
women. See 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-1268).
5. When focusing on the question of whether the government must fund abortions, courts and
legislatures must, as a threshold matter, define the meaning of medical necessity. In Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the decision to abort during the first trimester was
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deny state funding of abortion except in cases in which the life of the mother
is threatened, 6 and have relied on these statutes to deny state funding of inmates'
abortions. 7 Although these statutes have been held constitutional as applied to a
to be left solely to the woman and her physician. Id. at 163. In Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977),
however, the state's medicaid statute required pregnant women, seeking eligibility for funding, to
submit documented evidence of medical necessity from three physicians. In addition, the state
required that abortions be performed at an accredited hospital. Id. at 441 n.3. Both requirements
were upheld. Id. at 447. This contradicted the Court's holding in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192
(1973), which established that all factors-physical, psychological, and social-were to be considered
by a woman and her doctor only in deciding whether abortion was necessary. Furthermore, an
accreditation requirement was held not to meet constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 194.
6. E.g., 1977 Ga. Laws 234 § 16 (limiting state medicaid funding to those abortions qualifying for
federal funding-when the life of the mother would be endangered, when severe, long-lasting
physical health damage would result to the mother, or when the mother was a victim of rape or incest
and promptly reported the occurrence); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-10-3-3 (Burns Supp. 1979) (limiting state
funding to those situations where the life of the mother would be endangered); 1979 Mass. Adv.
Legis. Serv. ch. 268 (same); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.02 (West Supp. 1979) (limiting state funding to
those situations where the life or health of the mother would be endangered or where the mother was a
victim of rape or incest); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 6607 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (limiting state funding to
those situations where the life of the mother would be endangered); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §
28-6-4.5 (Supp. 1979) (same). According to one study of state medicaid funding for abortions, several
other states refuse to fund. The Alan Guttmacher Institute, State Medicaid Policies (Aug. 29, 1979).
In addition to the aforementioned, states restricting abortions to situations where the life of the
mother would be endangered are: Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. See id.
Other states restrict abortions to situations where the life or health of the mother would be en-
dangered or where the woman is a victim of rape or incest: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id. Kansas and New Mexico will fund
abortions when a woman's life is endangered or when a woman is a victim of rape or incest. See id.
Iowa's provision is the same except for the additional grant of funds when the fetus is deformed. See
id. Eight of these states, however, are under court order to provide funding of medically necessary
abortions: Georgia (Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979)), Louisiana (Emma G. v.
Edwards, No. 77-1342 (E.D. La. Nov. 27, 1978), appealfiled, No. 79-1144 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978)),
New Jersey (Right to Choose v. Byrne, No. 3817-77 (Super. CL N.J. July 2, 1979)), Ohio (Planned
Parenthood Affiliates v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ohio 1979)), Pennsylvania (Roe v. Casey,
464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978)), Virginia (Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978)), West
Virginia (Smith v. Ginsberg, No. 75-0380 (S.D.W. Va. May 9, 1978)), Wisconsin (Doe v. Percy, No.
79-367 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 1979)). Utah is under a court order to provide funding according to the
standard of the Hyde Amendment. D.R. v. Mitchell, No. 78-1675 (10th Cir. Oct. 25, 1979);see note4
supra. Additionally, the constitutionality of three state statutes restricting funds for abortion has been
questioned: Connecticut (Women's Health Servs. v. Maher, No. 79-405 (D. Conn. Jan. 7, 1980)),
Illinois (Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (N.D. ill.), vacated, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.),
review granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-5)), Missouri (Reproductive Health
Servs. v. Freeman, No. 79-1275 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980)). The Eighth Circuit's decision concerning
Missouri's law also casts doubt on Minnesota's statute restricting funding. Hodgson v. Board of
County Comm'rs, No. 79-1665 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980). Furthermore, the state of California has
continued to fund medically necessary abortions pursuant to a court order. Comision Femenil
Mexicana v. Cory, No. 24053 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 6, 1979).
7. Prisoner atM. C. I. Framingham v. King, No. 79-1498-N (D. Mass., filed July 31, 1979,
withdrawn as moot Aug. 10, 1979). The Commonwealth of Massachusetts refused an inmate's
requestfor an abortion because of astate policy not to fund abortions. Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Prisoner at M.C.I. Framingham v. King, No.
79-1498-N (D. Mass., filed July 31, 1979, withdrawn as moot Aug. 10, 1979). Subsequently, that
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free woman, at least when limited to nontherapeutic abortions,8 the issue of an
inmate's right to a government funded abortion remains unresolved. 9
Both the free woman's and the prisoner's right to abortion is grounded in the
constitutional right of privacy' ° and may not be unduly burdened by the gov-
ernment. " Due to this identity of interest, an inmate's right to a government
funded abortion may not be recognized as a separate issue, for it may be assumed
that the prisoner would at least be subject to the same limitations as the free
person. More acute analysis, however, suggests that the policy considerations
underlying the funding of abortions for indigent women are quite distinct from
the constitutional underpinnings of funding abortions for incarcerated women.
Because alternative sources of funding are available to the free woman,
denying government funds for an indigent free woman's abortion may be accept-
able. For the indigent prisoner, however, the state is the only source of financing,
and its refusal to aid the inmate may create an unconstitutional, undue burden.
In addition, although states are not constitutionally obligated to fund abortions
policy was formalized by a statutory enactment. 1979 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 268. In Doe v.
Jennings, No. 79-681D (W.D. Pa. May 23, 1979), the warden of a county jail refused to allow an
inmate to obtain a first trimester abortion without a court order. The district court ordered that the
inmate be transported outside for an abortion, but that she fund the procedure. In Commonwealth of
Virginia v. Doe, Nos. 13899-13905 (Cir. Ct. Arlington County, Mar. 1, 1979), the officials of tle
Arlington County jail refused to allow an inmate to obtain an abortion although a clinic had agreed to
perform the abortion without charge. The court ordered that the inmate be allowed to receive an
abortion as long as the expense would not be borne by the county.
8. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519(1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977).
9. See Prisoner at M.C.I. Framingham v. King, No. 79-1498-N (D. Mass., filed July 31, 1979,
withdrawn as moot Aug. 10, 1979). Other difficult problems have arisen in the area of government
funding. States choosing to participate in federal medicaid programs must, under Title XIX of tle
Social Security Act §§ 1901-11, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396j (1976), establish "reasonable standards"
to determine which health care services to fund. Id. § 1396a(a)(17). The Supreme Court has left
open the possibility that "serious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan
excluded necessary medical [abortions] from its coverage." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
This is precisely the issue before the Supreme Court in Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir,),
review granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 197')) (No. 79-5). The Court has consolidated
three cases and will hear oral arguments in the spring of 1980. Lower courts have been
inconsistent in their treatment of the issue. See Hodgson v. Board of County Comm'rs, No.
79-1665 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980) (as a statutory matter, state need only finance abortions
contemplated by the Hyde Amendment); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979) (same); Women's Health Servs. v. Maher, No. 79-405 (D. Conn. Jan.
7, 1980) (same); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (as a statutory matter, state
must finance medically necessary abortions); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
appealfiled, No. 79-1247 (3d Cir. Jan. 23, 1979) (same). D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D.
Utah), appealfiled, No. 78-1675 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 1978) (as a statutory matter, state need only
finance abortions contemplated by Hyde Amendment). See also Note, Limiting Public Funds for
Abortions: State Response to Congressional Action, 13 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 923 (1979). An
additional concern has been whether funding childbirth services without funding medically
necessary abortions establishes an arbitrary classification violating constitutional equal protection.
At least three courts have held that it does. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, No.
79-1275, slip op. at 15 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980); McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804, slip op.
at 301-15 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980), appeal docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W.
3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-1268); Women's Health Servs. v. Maher, No. 79-405 (D. Conn.
Jan. 7, 1980).
10. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
11. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464. 473-74 (1977).
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or furnish any other medical services for indigent persons, '2 they are obligated by
the eighth amendment 13 to provide all prisoners with medical treatment.1
4
Furthermore, the state's denial of an inmate's request for an abortion creates an
impermissible classification violating equal protection.
This Note explores the nature of an inmate's right to a state funded abortion
and contends that, regardless of the Supreme Court's decision on the issue of
government funded, medically necessary abortions for free women,' 5 the
Constitution mandates that prisoners be granted abortions at government
expense. This conclusion might seem anomalous in the sense that the inmate,
who has brought about her own detention through some culpable conduct,
would be eligible for a social benefit that a free woman would not be able to
secure. Constitutional guarantees, however, cannot be stripped from an
individual regardless of her situation. 16 Part I of this Note examines the
foundation of the inmate's rights to abortion and the prohibition against
government creation of an undue burden. The state's constitutional obligation
under the eighth amendment to provide all inmates with state funded medical
care is discussed in Part II. Finally, in Part m, the limitations on the inmate's
access to a state funded abortion are discussed in terms of an equal protection
analysis.
I. PRIVACY, ABORTION, AND UNDUE BURDEN
A woman is not wholly stripped of her constitutional rights when she is
imprisoned. 17 Even though incarcerated, "no iron curtain" separates an inmate
from the constitutional guarantee not to "be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. "18 The Supreme Court has held that a woman's right
to abortion is a liberty interest to be protected from undue government interfer-
ence by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 19 The
12. Id. at 469.
13. U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
14. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). InEstelle, the Court enunciated the basis of an
inmate's constitutional right to medical care and formulated the standard of medical care that the
prison is obligated to provide. See notes 61-65 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F. 2d 196 (7th Cir.), review granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov,
26, 1979) (No. 79-5); McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980), appeal
docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-1268).
16. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); see Procunier v. Martinez. 416 U.S. 396,
405-06 (1974) ("When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee,
federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."); cf. Lochner v. New York.
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (the Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying
them conflict with the Constitution of the United States").
17. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Prisoners retain such fundamental rights as
the free exercise of religion, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), freedom of speech, Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974), access to the courts, Johnson v. At'ery, 393 U.S. 483, 485
(1969), equal protection, Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333,333 (1968), and due process of law. Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 558; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,521 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1971); see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945).
18. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
19. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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genesis of this right is the individual's right to privacy. 20 "[Wihether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restric-
tions upon state action.. . or... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights
to the people, [the right of privacy] is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."'2' The intimate nature of
the decision whether, when, and in what manner a person chooses to remain the
"vehicle for another human being'9 creation" is a liberty protected from unre-
strained government intrusion. 22
Although the right to abortion is founded in the constitutional protections of
liberty, it is not an unqualified right and cannot be exercised "at whatever time, in
whatever way, and for whatever reason [the pregnant woman] alone chooses." 23
Regulations limiting fundamental rights, however, can be justified only
upon showing compelling government interest embodied in narrowly drawn
enactments. 24 A woman's right to abortion is therefore properly limited when the
20. Id. The right to privacy enjoys an honorable and impressive history. It has long been
acknowledged as an area of tort law and has been described as "a right of complete immunity; to be let
alone." T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888). Warren and Brandeis first
articulated the basis for the existence of the right to privacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). The authors concluded that the broader principle of privacy
underlying defamation and invasion of property cases deserved recognition as a sufficient basis for a
separate cause of action. Id. at 219-20; see Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1960);
Comment, Employee Privacy Rights: A Proposal, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 155, 160-64 (1978). Since the
initial exposition of Warren and Brandeis, the right of privacy has been viewed as encompassing the
protection of an individual's interest in being free from intrusion in private affairs, from public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts, from publicity placing her in a false light, and from
appropriation of her name or likeness for another's benefit. Prosser, supra, at 389. Although earlier
Supreme Court opinions had alluded to the right of privacy, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327
(1937), overruled, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). the Court gave privacy official constitu-
tional sanction only recently. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). The phrase the
"new liberty" attests to privacy's late acknowledgement as a constitutionally protected right.
P. Freund, A. Sutherland, M. Howe, & E. Brown, Constitutional Law 1112 (4th ed. 1977). Though no
express doctrinal phraseology exists, the right of privacy is constitutionally based in the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (privacy is founded In the
penumbra of the first amendment's guarantee of the right of association, the third amendment's
prohibition of the quartering of soldiers, the fourth amendment's prohibition of unlawful searches
and seizures, the fifth amendment's creation of a zone of privacy, and the ninth amendment's
preservation of rights of the people). It also derives support from the restrictions imposed by the
fourteenth amendment on state interference with individual liberty. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973). The due process clause of the fifth amendment protects an individual from federal interfer-
ence with fundamental rights in the same way that the fourteenth amendment prohibits state
interference. Thus, privacy is recognized as a fundamental right" 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' " and human dignity, protected against both federal and state infringement. Id. at 152-53
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
22. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-10, at 921 (1978).
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
24. Id. at 155; Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965);Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406(1963); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
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state's interests in maternal health, medical standards, and potential life become
compelling at the various stages of pregnancy. 2s Conversely, a woman's right to
terminate pregnancy is improperly limited when the government imposes an
undue burden on that right.2 6 Notwithstanding the legitimate interests of the
state in the protection of health and potential life, the state creates such a burden
when it interferes with a woman's fundamental right to abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy, 2 7 or when it prohibits abortion of a viable fetus if the
abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 28
An inmate's fundamental right to an abortion cannot justifiably be limited
based on the government's penological interests. When an inmate is deprived of
her right to terminate pregnancy, she is effectively divested of a protected liberty
interest.29 This contradicts an inmate's constitutional guarantee to the full
exercise of all fundamental rights not essential to the realization of legitimate
penological purposes3°-retribution, deterrence, protection of society, and re-
habilitation.3 1 As would be the case with a threatened infringement of any of her
other fundamental rights, the courts must weigh a woman's right to abortion
against the considerations of the penal system. 32 The government's interest in
"the preservation of internal order and discipline, the maintenance of institu-
tional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the
prisoners,1 33 must be balanced against the constitutional rights of inmates,
including the constitutional right of abortion.
Although some privacy rights, most notably those concerning searches 34 and
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973). The state's interest is based on the theory that
"t]he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus ....
[lt is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest,
that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The
woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured
accordingly." Id. at 159. Similarly, a state's interest in the protection of maternal health enables the
state to promulgate "requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the
abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be
performed." Id. at 163.
26. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,472 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 162, 164-65 (1973).
Undue burden has been described as an absolute or arbitrary veto of the right. See note 39 infra and
accompanying text.
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
28. Id.
29. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
30. United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F.2d 763, 764 (2d
Cir. 1975); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1315 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1372 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932
(1974).
31. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 n.13 (1949); see S. Kadish & At. Paulsen,
Criminal Law and Its Processes 1-39 (3d ed. 1975).
32. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) ("It is in the light of these legitimate penal
objectives that a court must assess challenges to prison regulations based on asserted constitutional
rights of prisoners.'.
33. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974) (footnote omitted).
34. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979).
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the reading of mail, 35 are minimized by the exigencies of prison security,3 6 the
privacy right encompassing a woman's right to abortion does not detract in any
respect from legitimate penological purposes or other government interests.
Society is no less protected, crime is no less deterred, retribution is not under-
mined, and rehabilitation is not hindered by the exercise of a prisoner's right to
have an abortion. 37
Because a state clearly cannot deprive an inmate of her right to abortion, it
appears that the state may also have an affirmative duty to secure the protection
of that right by providing access to, as well as funding for, an abortion. Statutes
restricting government funds for abortion 38 must be analyzed to determine
whether they create an undue burden when applied to an inmate. In all situa-
tions, an absolute or arbitrary veto of the decision to abort constitutes an undue
burden and is unconstitutional. 39 An inmate who chooses to terminate preg-
nancy must rely totally on the department of correctional services to arrange for
her abortion and provide access to the health facility where it is to be per-
formed. 40 Denial of access is an absolute interdiction: the state's refusal to
facilitate the exercise of the inmate's decision to terminate pregnancy is the
equivalent of an absolute veto. If the state were allowed to deny a prisoner access
to abortion, the inmate would then retain only a hollow right, incapable of
fulfillment because of state restriction.
35. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-77 (1974).
36. Cell searches, body searches, and reading of mail are necessitated by the fact that "[simug-
gling of money, drugs, weapons and other contraband is all too common an occurrence" in prisons,
thus posing a threat to prison security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
37. Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1977). Inmates have the constitutional right to
receive medical treatment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Moreover, a prison's health
care system must meet constitutional requirements: the prison must provide a medical staff, Includ-
ing a physician, and adequate physical facilities accessible to inmates. Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d
at 50; Comptroller General of the United States, A Federal Strategy is Needed to Help Improve
Medical and Dental Care in Prisons and Jails 6 (Dec. 22, 1978).
38. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
39. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). In that case, the Supreme Court
refused to uphold a state statute requiring parental or spousal consent for abortion. "(VWe cannot hold
that the State has the constitutional authority to give the spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the
wife from terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that right." Id. at 70. No state
interest in preserving a family member's rights could justify such a statutory requirement. "[Tjhe
State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." Id. at 74. In Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132
(1976), the Court stated that state regulation of abortion "is not unconstitutional unless it unduly
burdens the right to seekan abortion."Id. at 147. The Court, reasoning that a state statute requiring
parental consent would constitute an undue burden, id. at 148-51, remanded the case to the district
court for proceedings consistent with its decision. The district court declared the statute unconstitu-
tional. 450 F. Supp. 997 (1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). In affirming, the Supreme Court stated
that the requirement of parental consent might be justified if the state would "provide an alternative
procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained." 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3048 (1979)
(footnote omitted). A procedure for judicial determination of the minor's maturity or best interests,
without parental notice, consultation, or consent, would fulfill the alternative procedure mandate.
Id. at 3050.
40. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir.
1977).
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Access in the context of the prison system, however, might require the state to
do more than simply arrange for a doctor and a hospital. If the state were not to
fund the abortion of an inmate lacking the financial resources necessary to pay for
it, the inmate might be precluded from terminating her pregnancy. The indigent
inmate could be compared to the indigent free women in Maher v. Roe,4' who
also could not procure abortions because of their financial condition. In Maher,
the Court held that a state's refusal to fund nontherapeutic abortions for indigent
free women is permissible. 42 It might similarly be concluded that a state does not
create an undue burden when it refuses to fund an indigent inmate's abortion
because the state is not necessarily imposing an absolute veto: it would allow the
prisoner to have an abortion if she could pay for it. Because the state did not
create the inmate's indigency in the first instance, some would claim that it need
not alleviate that hardship. 43 Moreover, it could be argued that alternatives to
state funding are not barred; the inmate may seek private sources of funding for
41. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
42. Id. at473-74. Neither an arbitrary veto nor government compulsion is imposed by the state's
decision to deny the funding of nontherapeutic abortions of indigent women. Abortion is not barred;
private sources of funding are available. For example, the Justice Fund was established by National
Planned Parenthood to provide financial aid for indigent women who were precluded from medicaid
funding. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, The Justice Fund (undated pamphlet). Wom-
en's groups have funded abortions for indigent women on an ad hoc basis. Additionally, some clinics
adopt sliding scale fees for those unable to pay for abortions. Telephone Interview with Amelia
Zalcman, National Abortion Federation (Feb. 5, 1980) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law
Review). An alternative, private financing, though made difficult by indigency, nevertheless exists.
"The indigency that may make it difficult--and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some
women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the (regulation denying
funding]". Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474.
In Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,447 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the state's refusal to provide
medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions did not violate Title XIX of the Social Security Act §§
1901-11, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396j (1976). The Court was cognizant of the fact that a state is not
obligated to provide funding for medical treatment of needy persons. 432 U.S. at 441. Although states
choosing to participate in medicaid programs are required by statute to establish " 'reasonable
standards ... for determining.., the extent of medical assistance,' "id. at 441, 444 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976)), the Court noted that there is nothing in Title XIX suggesting that
participating states must fund every medical procedure. Id. at 444. It acknowledged, however, that
the exclusion of necessary medical treatment from a state's medical plan may present serious
statutory questions. Id.; see note 9 supra. The Court reemphasized that states were not constitution-
ally obligated to pay for pregnancy-related, or indeed any, medical expenses of indigents in Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. at 469. The Supreme Court's decisions upholding the right of a state to refuse to fund
nontherapeutic abortions have received much criticism. The strong dissenting opinions, id. at 482
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 448, 454 (Brennan, J. dissenting); id. at 454
(Marshall, J., dissenting), and law review articles have noted their disapproval, examined the scope
of the decisions, and have suggested novel approaches in circumventing their force. Canby, Govern-
ment Funding, Abortions, and the Public Forum, 1 Ariz. St. L.J. 11 (1979); Perry, The Abortion
Funding Cases: A Comment On The Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 Geo. L.J.
1191(1978); Comment, Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Non-Therapeutics Abortions: The State Does
Not Have To Pay The Bill, 9 Loyola U.L.J. 288 (1977); Note, Beal, Maher and Poelker: The End of
An Era?, 17 J. Fan. L. 49 (1978). It is not the purpose of this article to add to the criticisms but rather
to distinguish the issues pertaining to free indigent women from the issues pertaining to imprisoned
women.
43. But see notes 44-48 infra and accompanying text.
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the service she desires. It could therefore be contended that it is the inmate's lack
of money, rather than the state's denial of funding, that is the cause of her
inability to terminate pregnancy.
A closer analysis, however, suggests an opposite conclusion. The comparison
of an indigent free woman to an indigent inmate is seriously flawed for several
reasons. First, the indigent inmate, unlike her free counterpart, is completely
dependent on the state for all medical treatment; "if the authorities fail to [meet
her medical needs], those needs will not be met."'44 In addition, the inmate's
employment opportunities are controlled by the state. If she is permitted to work
at all, she works within the prison, for limited time periods, and at minimal
prison wages. 4- Thus, her ability to earn enough money to pay for an abortion is
virtually nonexistent while she is incarcerated. Furthermore, outside sources of
income, most notably welfare payments and medicaid services, are not available
to the inmate. 46 Even if private sources were willing to fund the inmate's
abortion, her constitutional guarantee to medical care should not be dependent
on the whim of an individual. It is evident, therefore, that although the state
might not have created the inmate's indigency, it shackles her to indigent
status for as long as she is imprisoned.
Moreover, when a state incarcerates an individual, it assumes the responsibil-
ity to provide for her care. 47 This duty requires the state to protect the inmate's
constitutional rights by supporting several programs that it would not be obli-
gated to fund outside prison and that, in fact, it might be constitutionally
prohibited from funding outside the prison gates. 48 For example, the first
amendment prohibits the establishment of religion. 49 The use of government
funds to employ chaplains might be said to violate the establishment clause,50 yet
chaplains for prisoners are lawfully supported by federal and state funds.3 1 A
44. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
45. N.Y.S. Dep't of Correctional Services, Incentive Allowance Change Memorandum (Aug.
1. 1978). The highest rate of daily wages is between $1.15 and $1.25. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(17) (A) (inmates of public institutions are ineligible to receive medicaid
and welfare funds).
47. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976);
Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1977).
48. Cf. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,825(1977) ("[T]he cost of protecting a constitutional right
cannot justify its total denial."). The prison system cannot justify the elimination of constitutionally
protected rights by claims of administrative inconvenience and economic restraint. Id. at 824-2S.
49. U.S. Const. amend. I.
50. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (chaplains for the armed forces); see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (19S2); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
51. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (size and extent of demand are considerations In
determining whether chaplains must be provided for minority denominations at state expense);
Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir. 1970) (Roman Catholic and Protestant chaplains
provided in regular attendance; Rabbi provided on occasion). See generally J. Palmer, Constitutional
Rights of Prisoners §§ 6.2.3-.4.1 (2d ed. 1973). Similarly, chaplains for the armed services are
provided at government expense. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 253-55 (1948) (Reed,
J., dissenting); Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 101S (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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prohibition of the free exercise of religion would most likely result if inmates were
not provided the opportunity for religious practice.5 2 Similarly, prisoners have a
constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts, which is secured at the
considerable expense of the state-the state must provide them with law libraries
or assistance from persons trained in the law regardless of the inmate's financial
status.5 3 Analogously, the fact that the government need not fund the exercise of
a free woman's right to abortion does not lead to the conclusion that the state
need not fund the inmate's exercise of that right. This assertion has gained
acceptance on the federal level and in some states. 54 Despite the annual passage
by Congress of the Hyde Amendment,5 5 which restricts the disbursement of
government funds for abortion, the policy of the federal prison system has been
not only to arrange for an inmate's abortion, but also to pay for it. 5 6 The
Department of Justice reiterated this policy as recently as last year.-7
It is important to note that the right to state funding derives not from the
inmate's indigence but from her status as a ward of the state.5" Therefore, the
state must fund those services required for the exercise of the inmate's constitu-
tionally protected liberties, one of which is the right to terminate pregnancy. At
the very least, this requires that the state arrange for the abortion, as well as
finance the procedure for those inmates who cannot afford to pay for it them-
selves.
II. ABORTION, MEDICAL NEEDS, AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
No person, whether rich or poor, must pay for the treatment of her "medical
needs"5 9 while incarcerated, even if those needs do not rise to the level of medical
necessity. 60 The eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
52. Abington School Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); see
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 298, 329-30 (D.N.H. 1977).
53. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25, 828 (1977). In addition, indigent inmates must be
provided with supplies, notarial services, docketfees, and transcripts at state expense. Id. at 824-25.
54. FederalPrison System, U.S. Dep'tofJustice, Program Statement: Birth Control, Pregnancy,
Child Placement and Abortion (July 16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Federal Prison Policy]. New York
State also funds abortions for inmates. Telephone Interview with Sheila Barton, Legal Specialist,
N.Y.S. Dep't of Correctional Services (Jan. 28, 1980) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Barton Interview].
55. See note 4 supra. In urging the passage of the Hyde Amendment, Representative Dornan
relied on the fact that the government has "no constitutional obligation financially to facilitate the
exercise of privacy rights. The Federal Government must merely refrain from violating such rights."
123 Cong. Rec. H6086 (daily ed. June 17, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Dornan). In the case of the inmate,
however, the government does have the constitutional obligation of providing for the exercise of the
woman's privacy right to have an abortion. See pt. H infra. It is arguable, then, thatsupporters of the
amendment would agree that the Hyde restriction may not be applied to inmates.
56. 4 Fed. Reg. 64,085 (1977).
57. Federal Prison Policy, supra note 54.
58. Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
59. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977). "[A] convict is entitled to such
opportunities as satisfy his health needs." Id. at 309.
60. See notes 67-73 in~fra and accompanying text "Medical needs" include elective treatment
recommended by a physician but not "necessary" in a life or health saving sense. Laaman v.
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269,311 (D.N.H. 1977). Whether an abortion is a needed medical service is
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ment entitles all inmates to receive state funded medical treatment. 61 Although
this provision was originally interpreted as a proscription of torture and barbaric
methods of punishment, 62 its meaning has been extended to encompass "the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" resulting from the failure to treat the
medical needs of prisoners. 63 The government is obligated to prevent "pain and
suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose."64 Delib-
erate indifference on the part of prison doctors toward the medical needs of
inmates as well as denial or even intentional delay by prison officials in providing
medical care violates this constitutional mandate. 6s
A serious medical need has been defined as "one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. '66 Courts have
further established that a prisoner's eligibility for state funded medical treatment
is not limited to life-threatening situations. Indeed, dental hygiene, 67 psycholog-
ical care, 68 sinus conditions, 69 varicose veins,70 ulcers, 71 broken bones,72 fevers
and high blood pressure73 have been held to meet the standard of serious medical
need, thereby requiring the delivery of medical care at state expense.
Unwanted pregnancy arguably poses no less a serious medical need than does
sinus congestion. In Roe v. Wade, 74 the Supreme Court recognized that the
decision to secure an abortion involved a consideration of the physical and
mental health of the mother.75 Pregnancy, even under the most desirable cir-
cumstances, involves physical pain. Nausea, back pain, hyperventilation, blad-
der injuries, and labor pains are well-recognized concomitances of pregnancy. 76
a medical judgment that"may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psycholog-
ical, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 192 (1973); see note 5 supra.
61. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
62. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
63. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976);
Klein, Prisoners' Rights to Physical and Mental Health Care: A Modern Expansion of the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 7 Fordhamn Urb. L.J. 1 (1978-79); Neisser, is
There a Doctor in the Joint? The Search for Constitutional Standardsfor Prison Health Care, 63 Va.
L. Rev. 921 (1977); Comment, The Rights of Prisoners to Medical Care and the Implications for
Drug-Dependent Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 705 (1975).
64. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
65. Id. at 104-05.
66. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977).
67. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
68. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp.
269, 313 (D.N.H. 1977).
69. Derrickson v. Keve, 390 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Del. 1975).
70. Vest v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 160 (3d Cir. 1978).
71. Massey v. Hutto, 545 F.2d 45, 47 (8th Cir. 1976).
72. Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1978).
73. Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1977).
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. Id. at 153; see notes 78-88 infra and accompanying text.
76. L. Hellman & J. Pritchard, Williams Obstetrics 248-86 (14th ed. 1971). "Increased retention
of water has long been regarded as a characteristic biochemical alteration of late pregnancy," id. at
248; the bladder is "easily traumatized, and more susceptible to infection," id. at 266; "pregnancy
induces a certain degree of hyperventilation," id. at 260; it causes an "alteration of maternal posture,
which, in turn, may cause discomfort in the lower portion of the back, especially late in pregnancy.
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Moreover, the mortality rate among women during childbirth is higher than that
occurring during abortions performed in the early stages of pregnancy."
Unwanted pregnancy also has serious implications for a woman's mental
health. 78 Medical testimony demonstrates that unwanted pregnancy is a "source
of stress"'79 and can lead to "psychiatric symptoms"8 0 such as "severe mental
disturbance, including suicidal ideation."8 1 The "detriment"8 2 of unwanted
pregnancy has been found to be especially serious in cases of women in "trying
life" situations. 83 Pregnancies of indigent women, psychologically disturbed
women, and adolescents, as well as those occurring in circumstances in which
women experience feelings of "helpless insecurity," 4 frequently become "unen-
durably stressful and emotionally destructive." 85 Imprisonment is one additional
circumstance that exacerbates the detriment of unwanted pregnancy.86 A num-
ber of objective factors indigenous to the prison setting contribute to this: the
limited prenatal medical care and supervision, the high starch-low protein diet,
and the isolation from family and other support services.8 7 Furthermore, the
anxiety attendant upon not only bearing an unwanted child but also upon
eventually losing custody of that infant, constitutes a further reason for classify-
ing an inmate's abortion as a serious medical need.8 8
During the last trimester of pregnancy, aching, numbness, and weakness are occasionally noted in
the upper extremities. . . ." id. at 269. Finally, "pregnancy is frequently characterized by distur-
bances of the digestive system, particularly nausea and vomiting." Id. at 286.
77. 410 U.S. at 163.
78. Id. at 153. "Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
childcare. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care
for it. In other cases ... the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may
be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider
in consultation." Id.
79. McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804, slip op. at 119 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980),
appeal docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No.
79-1268). In this 328 page opinion, Judge Dooling considered numerous medical and sociological
studies on the effects of unwanted pregnancy on a woman's mental and physical health. Id. at
116-24.
80. Id. at 121; see, e.g., Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268
N.W.2d 683 (1978).
81. McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804, slip op at 116 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980), appeal
docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-1268).
82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Court uses the term "detriment" as a synonym
for the hardships of unwanted pregnancy.
83. McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804, slip op. at 116 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980),
appeal docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No.
79-1268). "Trying life" situations were described as those which were marked by poverty, mental
distress, pressures of adolescence, or physical complications. Id. at 116-24.
84. Id. at 123.
85. Id.
86. Affidavit of Professor Joan Smith at3, Affidavit of Catherine Walker at 2, Prisoner at M.C.I.
Framingham v. King, No. 79-1498N (D. Mass., filed July 31, 1979, withdrawn as moot Aug. 10,
1979).
87. Memorandum in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 8, Prisoner at
M.C.I. Framingham v. King, No. 79-1498N (D. Mass., filed July 31, 1979, withdrawn as moot Aug.
10, 1979).
88. Id.
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Moreover, from the point of view of medical treatment, the unwanted preg-
nancy presents a unique problem in terms of alternative therapeutic solutions:
there are none. It is unlike most other ailments for which the attending physician
may elect any one of a number of treatments to relieve a prisoner's pain and
suffering. In a case where a prisoner complains of back pain, for example, the
available procedures are numerous-bed rest, exercise, muscle relaxers, trac-
tion, or surgery. s 9 No one method is guaranteed to alleviate pain and suffering. If
one treatment proves unsuccessful, another is available. 90 In the case of un-
wanted pregnancy, however, only one medical procedure-abortion-will al-
leviate the potential for serious physical and psychological pain and suffering of
the inmate. 91 In the same way that an absolute refusal to treat the inmate's back
pain would constitute deliberate indifference to or an intentional denial of a
prisoner's medical needs, 92 so too failure to provide abortion services would
violate the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.
Providing prenatal medical care and childbirth services would not constitute an
alternative solution, because this approach would not fulfill the prison's respon-
sibility to supply treatment alleviating the pain and suffering inherent in bearing
an unwanted child.
A second comparison will serve to sharpen the distinction between possibly
frivolous or questionable psychological harm and the documented evidence of
psychological injury that is likely to be incurred by a woman, especially an
imprisoned one, bearing an unwanted child. The state is required, for example,
to treat a prisoner's complaint of pain and suffering resulting from a broken
nose.9 3 It may not be required, however, to perform cosmetic surgery. 94 In the
latter case, the psychological pain and suffering that an inmate might suffer from
the disfigurement cannot be objectively measured and is not a socially recognized
injury. 95 Further, because cosmetic surgery can be performed even years after
89. Dr. D.M. Long, Dealing With Backache: Expert Advice, U.S. News & World Report, Apr.
2, 1979, at 51-53.
90. Id.
91. McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804, slip op. at 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980),
appeal docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No.
79-1268). According to a British study relied on by Judge Dooling, id., the termination of
pregnancy by abortion causes little psychological disturbance while continuation of unwanted
pregnancy leads to serious psychiatric harm. Id. at 122.
92. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text.
93. Derrickson v. Keve, 390 F. Supp. 905, 905 (1975);see Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1296
(4th Cir. 1978) (broken arm).
94. Interview with Dr. Thomas Krizek, Professor of Surgery (Plastic), Columbia University
College of Physicians and Surgeons, and Chief, Division of Plastic Surgery, Columbia Presbyterian
Medical Center (Feb. 7, 1980) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Krizek Interview]. At least three states, Maryland, New York, and Texas, have voluntarily provided
inmates with cosmetic surgery. Id. New York State funds any treatment that is "medically founded,"
Barton Interview, supra note 54. New York City, for instance, funded reconstructive surgery for
inmate William Morales, who had lost both hands in the explosion that led to his arrest. Morales had
already been sentenced when he escaped from Bellevue Hospital, where he was being fitted for
artificial hands before being transferred to astate prison. N. Y. Times, May 22, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 5.
95. Krizek Interview, supra note 94. Insurance companies, for example, generally will pay for
cosmetic surgery performed on tissue altered by disease, illness, or accident, but will not pay for
cosmetic surgery performed on normal tissue for the sole purpose of improving appearance. In the
latter instance, the companies refuse reimbursement because the procedure is not recognized as a
medical need. Id.
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the injury, 9 6 the prisoner has a complete medical remedy once she is released
from the institution. In sharp contrast, medical treatment at childbirth, even
when coupled with adoption, does not alleviate the trauma of unwanted preg-
nancy.9 7 The pregnant woman only has up to nine months to receive the
necessary medical treatment. Once that period of time has elapsed, no alterna-
tives remain-the pain and suffering has not been alleviated, and it no longer can
be.
m. FINANCING, CLASSIFICATIONS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Under the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that the state is constitutionally
obligated to provide an inmate access to an abortion by arranging for the doctors
and facilities, and by financing the abortion if the inmate is unable to pay. It
remains to be determined whether the state may refuse to fund the abortions of
those inmates who can afford them, or whether the state is obligated to finance
the abortions of all inmates who desire them. A strong argument can be made to
support each view. On the one hand, it has been recognized that the state has an
interest sufficient to justify its refusal to fund nontherapeutic abortions for
indigent free women. 98 Although this rationale is untenable when applied to
indigent inmates, it nevertheless could be argued that the state should not be
required to fund abortions for nonindigent inmates.
On the other hand, the state does not have the right to put conditions on its
obligation to provide an inmate with needed medical treatment.99 Withholding
access to medical treatment pending payment by the inmate creates impermissi-
ble physical and psychological burdens and might be tantamount to denying the
medical care required under the eighth amendment. The risks and illnesses
accompanying unwanted pregnancy, aggravated by state inaction, are penalties
additional to those imposed upon the inmate by the prison sentence.100 The
woman is forced to bear punishment "which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose."'1 1 By excluding women who might be able to afford an
abortion from receiving state funded medical care, the state is limiting the
purview of the eighth amendment. Instead, it is establishing, in abortion cases,
an exception to the inmate's constitutional right to state funded medical treat-
ment. 10
2
Given the constitutional mandate to provide for the medical needs of prison-
ers, denial of some medical services by the state should be subject to the strict
96. Id.
97. See McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804, slip op. at 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980),
appeal docketed sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-1268).
98. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977). The Supreme Court in Afaher found that the state's
interest was to promote childbirth. It weighed this interest against the pregnant woman's right to be
free from state action burdening her right to abortion and upheld the state restriction on funds for
abortion.
99. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 309,
311-12 (D.N.H. 1977).
100. Cf. Houchinsv. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 37 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("While a ward
of the State and subject to its stern discipline, [the inmate] retains constitutional protections against
cruel and unusual punishment . . .).
101. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
102. See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text.
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scrutiny standard of the equal protection analysis. 10 3 This rigorous standard is
applied only when a statute creates a classification affecting either a suspect
class-race,10 4 religion,IOs or alienage' 06-or the exercise of a fundamental
right, 0 7 such as the inmate's right to a state funded abortion. Strict scrutiny
requires a state to justify its classification by showing that it has a compelling
interest in the right it seeks to regulate. 108 By denying public funding for a
prisoner's abortion the state would restrict that right. It would also create two
impermissible distinctions: first, between the rights of all inmates seeking general
medical care and the rights of those women seeking abortions, and second, be-
tween those inmates seeking childbirth services and those seeking abortions.10 9
When legislation establishes a classification that limits fundamental rights,
the Supreme Court will not sustain the classification merely on the bare showing
of a rational relationship between the statute and the ends it is purported to
103. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In determining whether state
action violates equal protection, the Supreme Court has formulated a two tier analysis: strict scrutiny
and rational basis. The Court "must decide, first, whether [state action] operates to the disadvantage
of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.... If not, the (action] must still be examined
to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore
does not constitute an invidious discrimination.. .. "Id. at 17. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion), the Court suggested a third tier of equal protection review, more
stringent than the rational basis analysis and less demanding than strict scrutiny. At least for
classifications based on gender, the statute in question must be substantially related to an important
governmental interest. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
316-17 (1977); see Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 Geo. L.J. 1071 (1974). The
demonstrable basis standard suggested by Professor Nowak is roughly equivalent to the "intensified
means scrutiny" described by Professor Gunther. "In the context of fundamental interests or suspect
classifications, the Court would continue to demand that the means be more than reasonable-e.g.,
that they be 'necessary,' or the 'least restrictive' ones." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a NewerEqual Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1972).
According to Professor Gunther, one can expect the Court in cases such as these to be "less willing to
strain for conceivable justifications, less ready to hypothesize imaginable facts that might underlie
questionable classifications, less inclined to tolerate substantial over- and underinclusiveness in
deference to legislative flexibility." Id. at 33; see Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605 (1973).
104. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
105. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
107. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
108. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
InLoving, the Court held that the state had no compelling justification for a racially discriminatory
law. The right to marry a person of another race could not be limited by a state's interest In
maintaining white supremacy. Id. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court struck
down a municipal ordinance requiring licensing of laundries. The state's apparent interest in fire
safety could not be furthered by a racially discriminatory ordinance. Id. at 374. In Shapiro, the
right to interstate travel was more compelling than the state's interest in establishing a one year
residency requirement for welfare payments. 394 U.S. at 629-31.
109. Memorandum In Support Of Application For Temporary Restraining Order at 11, Prisoner
at M.C.I. Framingham v. King, No. 79-1498N (D. Mass., filed July 31, 1979, withdrawn as moot
Aug. 10, 1979).
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serve."10 Because a classification has been made and because fundamental rights
are involved, the state must meet the strict scrutiny standard of the equal
protection analysis.
It appears that the government would not be able to establish a compelling
state interest sufficient to justify application of a statutory prohibition of state
funded abortions to inmates. ' 1 The state's interest in the protection of unborn
life only becomes compelling after the fetus has attained viability. 112 Though a
state may encourage childbirth, it cannot make childbirth the sole treatment of
pregnancy. 113 Furthermore, the state's possible interest in fiscal control cannot
justify the application of the questioned statute to inmates, because it is consid-
erably less expensive to fund an abortion than it is to underwrite childbirth and
aftercare services. 114 Additionally, no penological purpose is furthered by forc-
ing a prisoner to bear an unwanted child. I Is In fact, the penal goal of rehabilita-
tion might be impeded by the negative effect on an inmate's life of unwanted
pregnancy and the stigma attached thereto." 16
Although the Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe 17 held that failure to fund an
indigent woman's nontherapeutic abortion was not a violation of the equal
protection clause, that decision was based on a finding that the government does
not have an obligation to provide any medical services to indigent women. " "
Under this analysis, the question of a state funded abortion for a free woman does
not impinge on the issue of a fundamental right and thus does not call for the
application of the strict scrutiny standard. In Maher, the Court applied the
rational basis standard to determine whether a state may subsidize childbirth
while refusing to subsidize nontherapeutic abortions. 119 Rational basis requires
a state to justify its regulation by showing only that a legitimate state interest is
involved.' 20 The Court recognized such a legitimate interest in the state's desire
110. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977) (important
objective of preventing suburban flight insufficient to uphold restriction of free speech); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940) (obvious state interest in peace and good order insufficient
to sustain restriction of free exercise of religion); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973)
(compelling state interest needed to restrict right to abortion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (compelling state interest needed to restrict right to procreation).
111. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
112. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
113. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977).
114. Id. at 478-79; Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1217-19 (N.D. hi.), vacated, 596 F.2d
196 (7th Cir.), review granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-5).
115. See notes 30-37 supra and accompanying text.
116. Affidavit of Professor Joan Smith at 3, Affidavit of Catherine Walker at 3, Prisoner at
M.C.I. Framingham v. King, No. 79-1498N (D. Mass., filed July 31, 1979, withdrawn as moot Aug.
10, 1979); see notes 78-87 supra and accompanying text; cf. McRae v. Secretary, HEW, No. 76-1804
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980), appeal docketed sub non. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S.
Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-1268) (unwanted pregnancy has devastating effects in women burdened by
poverty, physical and psychological distress, and adolescence).
117. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
118. Id. at 469; see notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
119. 432 U.S. at 478. There is no constitutional obligation on the states to pay for any
medical expenses of free persons. Id. at 469. When a state chooses to pay for medical expenses,
however, the manner in which it does so is subject to constitutional limitations. Id. at 469-70.
120. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1976) (state interest in preserving
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to encourage childbirth and protect potential life. 1 21 The fundamental right to be
free from state restriction of abortion, which was judicially recognized in Roe v.
Wade, 122 is not inhibited by the state's refusal to fund a free woman's nonthera-
peutic abortion. 123 Other sources of funding are available, and the free woman
may still be able to procure an abortion. 124 The Maher Court found that the
statute in question did not "[penalize] the woman's decision to have an abortion
by refusing to pay for it."' 125 Refusing to fund an abortion for an inmate,
however, is in effect an unconstitutional penalty on the exercise of that right.
Because the inmate is "otherwise entitled to [medical] benefits, ... strict scrutiny
might be appropriate under . . . the penalty analysis."1 2 6
Subsequent to Maher, several courts have considered whether state refusals to
fund medically necessary abortions of free women might constitute a violation of
equal protection. 127 In such cases, it is necessary to evaluate the different weight
to be given the state's interest in encouraging childbirth and protecting the fetus,
and potential dangers to the health of the mother. These courts have reasoned
that the health of the woman is the paramount concern and takes precedence
over the state's interests in preserving the life of the fetus. 128 Therefore, the
state's interests would not meet even the minimal requirements of the rational
basis test. Similarly, state refusal to fund an inmate's abortion while it funds
childbirth service creates a classification that affects an inmate's fundamental
right to medical care and unduly burdens her decision to terminate pregnancy.
As such, the classification cannot be justified under any standards. The inmate's
appearance of city's French Quarter sustains regulation banning some street vendors); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (state interest in preserving residential neighborhoods
sustains regulation restricting land use to one family dwellings).
121. 432 U.S. at 478.
122. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
123. 432 U.S. at 475-77.
124. Id. at 474. The dissenting opinion, however, noted that the "stark reality for too many, not
just 'some,' indigent pregnant women is that indigency makes access to competent licensed physi-
cians not merely 'difficult' but 'impossible.' "Id. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Even If Justice
Brennan's position is correct, the fact that abortion could be made "impossible" for free women
does not affect the inmate's rights. See notes 47-58 supra and accompanying text; cf. note 42 supra
(private sources of funding may be available to indigent free women).
125. 432 U.S. at 474 n.8 (citing Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
126. Id.
127. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, No. 79-1275, slip op. at 25-26 (8th Cir. Jan. 9,
1980) ("[A] state has no constitutionally permissible interest in promoting the life of the fetus in a
woman for whom an abortion is medically necessary to preserve health or life."). Interest In
protecting the life of the fetus is secondary to the protection of a woman's health. Women's Health
Servs., Inc. v. Maher, No. 79-405 (D. Conn. Jan. 7, 1980); Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1218
(N.D. Ill.), vacated, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), review granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979)
(No. 79-5); see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979).
128. E.g., Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, No. 79-1275, slip op. at 25-26 (8th Cir. Jan. 9,
1980); Women's Health Servs., Inc. v. Maher, No. 79-405 (D. Conn. Jan. 7, 1980); Zbaraz v. Quern,
469 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (N.D. Ill.), vacated, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), review granted, 48 U.S.L.W.
3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-5). In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court considered
only the need to fund nontherapeutic abortions. Subsequently, courts have distinguished Maher on
this basis when they have considered the question of medically necessary abortions. See cases cited
note 9 supra.
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serious medical need for abortion outweighs the state's interest in promoting
childbirth to such an extent as to render that interest illegitimate. 129
Regardless of the standard applied, recognition of the personal and fundamen-
tal fights involved is determinative. "[W]hen state statutory classifications ap-
proach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, [the Supreme] Court exercises
a stricter scrutiny. 1 30 The inmate's fundamental right to abortion, a sensitive
and personal right, cannot be restricted by denying state funding without violat-
ing equal protection of the law. This is true whether the inmate seeking an
abortion is indigent, or whether she has independent financial resources.
CONCLUSION
It is within the purview of state legislatures to enact laws having a direct
impact on prisoners' lives. Nevertheless, these laws, to the extent that they affect
fundamental rights, are subject to constitutional scrutiny. Although opinions are
sharply divided on the sensitive issue of public funding of abortions, the Con-
stitution remains the final arbiter when fundamental rights, such as the right to
abortion, are jeopardized. The eighth amendment obligates states to provide
needed medical treatment to all inmates. The guarantee of equal protection of
the law reaches every inmate, rich or poor. Legitimate state interests must yield
to constitutional mandates: the incarcerated pregnant woman has a right to a
state funded abortion.
Anne T. Vitale
129. See Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, No. 79-1275, slip op. at 28-29 (8th Cir. Jan. 9,
1980).
130. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
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